

Botnet business models, takedown attempts, and the darkweb market: a survey

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Botnets account for a substantial portion of cybercrime. Botmasters utilize darkweb marketplaces to promote and provide their services, which can vary from renting or buying a botnet (or parts of it), to hiring services (e.g. distributed denial of service attacks). At the same time, botnet takedown attempts have proven to be challenging, demanding a combination of technical and legal methods, and often requiring the collaboration of a plethora of entities with varying jurisdictions. In this article, we map the elements associated with the business aspect of botnets, and utilize them to develop adaptations of two widely used business models. Furthermore, we analyze the 28 most notable botnet takedown operations carried out over from 2008 to 2021, in regard to the methods employed, and illustrate the correlation between these methods and the segments of our adapted business models. Our analysis suggests that the botnet takedown methods have been mainly focused on the technical side, but not on the botnet economic components. We aim to shed light on new takedown vectors and incentivize takedown actors to expand their efforts to methods oriented more towards the business side of botnets, which could contribute towards eliminating some of the challenges that surround takedown operations.

CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: cybercrime, botnets, economics, business models, attacks, takedowns, marketplace, forum, darkweb

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1 INTRODUCTION

Cybercrime is a constantly increasing threat to the digital world [38, 125]. Attackers are evolving their methods of operation and defenders are trying to adapt to these methods, to effectively counter them. It is a never ending cycle, a cat-and-mouse game [39, 103], with data suggesting that the defenders are on the losing side, always being a step behind [12, 20, 93]. One of the main reasons behind cybercrime's constant evolution, is the economic incentive. Cyber criminals are motivated by profit to keep coming up with new ways to carry out their operations and evade the authorities' detection, defense and disruption attempts. The revenue of each cybercrime enterprise is proportionally linked to its ability to conduct its business uninterrupted and to the maximum potency possible. The smoother and more impactful the operations are, the more profit the organisation will eventually produce.

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Cybercrime actors have the option of utilising their resources privately or providing them as a product/service for a fee to potential clients, known as Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS). These clients can simply go online, access marketplaces both in the clearweb and the darkweb, and choose from a large variety of services. This leads to cybercriminals operating under an “as-a-service” model [62, 127] and essentially turning their collective operations into a business industry. An individual or organisation can build their business around a wide range of services that, depending on their nature, can be provided through various pricing models.

1.1 Botnet Background

The Internet Chat Relay (IRC) protocol is considered as the origin of botnets. Bots were initially benign and used by the protocol to provide services and support. The first IRC bot was created in 1993, under the name Eggdrop [26, 106, 124]. Eggdrop was then further developed, and soon malicious bots made their appearance. These bots’ purpose was to attack other IRC users or even whole servers, which in time resulted in these bots being engineered to be able to carry out Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [72] attacks. Nevertheless, the first botnet that managed to gain public attention was the *Earthlink Spammer* [35], which surfaced in 2000 and had been created by Khan K. Smith. The botnet managed to send over 1.25 million malicious emails in one year’s span, with the purpose of collecting sensitive information from users, such as credit card credentials. The number of botnets has increased to a significant degree since then, leading to various types of botnets, categorized based on certain characteristics.

In essence, botnets are devices infected by malware which allows them to be controlled by an individual other than the legitimate owner, called the botmaster. They can be used for a variety of purposes [71], the main ones being *information gathering* [25], *distributed computing* [129], *cyber fraud* [29], *spreading malware*, *cyberwarfare* [22, 140], *unsolicited marketing* [130], *network service disruption* [72], and *cryptojacking* [37, 96].

In addition to purpose, another point of differentiation amongst botnets is their architecture, which varies depending on the mechanism used to disseminate the botmaster commands throughout the botnet. There are three basic architectures: *centralised*, *decentralised* and *hybrid* [124] (see Figure 1). In a *centralised* architecture the bots receive the botmaster commands through one or more Command and Control (C&C) servers. In this scenario the C&C servers are the backbone of the infrastructure, providing coordination to the bot army, and the main protocols used are IRC and HTTP. In a *decentralised* architecture this task is carried out using a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol, with all of the bots contributing to the coordination of the bot network by disseminating commands¹ to their peers [56, 143]. Lastly, in a *hybrid* architecture, the dissemination mechanism is a combination of the two aforementioned architectures. An example would be a botnet using multiple C&C servers, tasked with handling a specific number of bots, which are communicating through P2P. Each architecture presents its own pros and cons. The fundamental advantages of the centralized architecture, are its speed and simplicity; however, it lacks in resilience due to the fact that the C&C servers are potential points of failure. The decentralized and hybrid architectures are more complex to implement but provide a higher level of resilience against takedown attempts.

Maintaining a healthy bot supply is a priority for botmasters. This is where the propagation mechanism comes into play. There are two major families of mechanisms tasked with the propagation of the bot malware: *active* and *passive* [71]. Active propagation is achieved mainly through scanning, where the infected devices search for new potential hosts, without the need of human interaction. Passive propagation on the other hand, requires a certain level of human interaction, with *Drive-by Download*, *Infected Media*, and *Social Engineering* as the main mechanisms utilized [71].

¹In this case, due to the lack of C&C servers, the botmaster can instead connect to one of the bots to issue the commands, which will gradually spread via P2P to the rest of the botnet.




Fig. 1. Examples of the *Centralized*, *Decentralized*, and *Hybrid* botnet architectures.

Stealth is always critical when running any illegal enterprise. Botmasters are using a variety of methods, like Bulletproof Hosting Services (BPHS) [6, 54] (see Section 3.2.1) and fluxing techniques [7, 71], that aim to obfuscate the C&C server(s). These methods provide takedown resilience to botnets, since they make locating the C&C server a challenging task for takedown actors. Furthermore, many botmasters, have started utilising the darkweb, and specifically the Tor network [7], aiming to provide increased stealth to their operations. The way they achieve this is by using a Tor *Hidden Service (HS)* [139] as the C&C server, a service which can only be found inside the Tor network and only if someone possesses the unique address of the service, known as the *Onion Address*. This infrastructure provides even greater resilience to the C&C server. However, the darkweb is not only being used for C&C obfuscation purposes. It also serves as the most popular marketplace for botmasters to advertise and provide their services through HSs, and that is mainly thanks to the anonymity that it provides to potential users – clients. The combination of cost effectiveness and resilience, has led to botnets turning into a very successful market, where someone can buy a whole botnet infrastructure, rent one (or even parts of it) or acquire the services of one (e.g. attacks) [62, 113].

The reason why botnets are so widely used by cybercriminals is because they can be inexpensive to deploy while being effective, turning them into one of the most common threats on the Internet for many years [35, 38]. In the hands of a malicious user, they can be a source of significant financial harm, contributing to cybercrime amounting to billions of dollars in damages annually and specifically closing in on \$1 trillion in 2020 [125]. Additionally, in recent years, Internet of Things (IoT) botnets have been on the rise, with *Mirai* [8, 72] being a prime example, making matters even worse by providing new bot supply sources for botmasters. These types of botnets are networks of devices like smart watches, cameras, medical sensors and smart refrigerators, adding to the recruitment potential of botmasters.

With so many options being available to botmasters in regard to bot assimilation and coordination, obfuscation of their operations, as well as selling platforms, takedown operations are bound to face many challenges (see Section 4.3). These challenges can be technical, legal [32, 146], or related to jurisdiction, since in most cases botnet architectures tend to be spread over different countries. To counter the elusiveness and resilience of botnet operations, in many occasions several organisations (e.g. law enforcement agencies, large corporations, legal authorities) will pool their

resources together, to increase the effectiveness of takedown attempts. This approach has proven fruitful over the years, but demands careful coordination.

1.2 Article contributions

The topic of botnets is widely popular among researchers, a fact that has led to notable work on several of their aspects, namely their use purposes, architectures, defence, detection, evasion/obfuscation, as well as research focusing on their economic elements (see Section 5.) We argue that due to the state of the botnet ecosystem there is promise in further researching the economic infrastructure of botnets. Their operation, which resembles that of a legitimate online business, follows certain business models. Researching those models provides insight on how the botnet economy operates internally. In this article, we explore the financial ecosystem of a botnet business, map its components by developing two adaptations of the *Value Chain Model* and the *Business Model Canvas*, and analyse how this ecosystem can be correlated to takedown attempts performed against 28 botnets from the year 2008 and onward. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work following such an approach. The ultimate goal we aim to contribute towards are economic disruption methods, which can be a valuable addition to the arsenal of botnet takedown operations. Such methods would eliminate various challenges these operations often face, such as legal issues, technical issues (e.g. reverse engineering of the botnet malware), or issues related to the jurisdiction of the entities involved [32, 146] (see Section 4.3). Hence, the identification of weak points in the botnet business models that are directly related to revenue generation, and their exploitation, can prove to be a very efficient tool in the fight against botnet cybercrime, by striking at the heart of the botnet cybercrime, namely the generation of profit. Hindering the mechanisms that operate under the revenue making umbrella, would gradually take away the botmasters' incentives, by making their efforts not worth the risks that accompany running a cybercrime enterprise.

The contribution of this work can be summarized in the following points. In this paper we:

- illustrate how the *Value Chain Model* and the *Business Model Canvas* can be used to map out the elements of a botnet infrastructure operating as a profitable business, leading to the development of two adapted models,
- analyze takedown attempts against 28 botnets from 2008 until 2021, in terms of takedown methods utilized, and illustrate the correlation between these methods and our adapted models,
- explore the technical, legal, and jurisdictional challenges that surround botnet takedown operations,
- provide insight on potential directions for future botnet takedown operations.

1.3 Methodology

The first step in our process for this work was gathering scientific research papers suitable to provide background information on botnets, covering several of their aspects (e.g. architectures and detection methods) (see Sections 1 and 5). Surveys and taxonomies on botnets, with a high scientific contribution, were a valuable source for this information.

Secondly, after choosing to utilize Michael Porter's *Value Chain Model* [108] and Alexander Osterwalder's *Business Model Canvas* [102] because of their popularity and wide application, with the goal of mapping out the elements of a botnet as a business, we explored the authors' original work, as well as available online resources, such as articles on economics which elaborated on the two models' implementation.

The next phase was dedicated to research on the specific topic of botnet economics (see Section 5.2), which also included work gravitating towards the development of disruption methods, with elements related to economics as their

209 foundation. In order to create an archive of papers to review on this subject, we carried out a literature review on the
210 basis of keywords and phrases such as “*botnet economics*”, “*botnet disruption*”, and “*botnet takedown*”.

211 The fourth step incorporated analyzing past botnet takedowns since 2008, in terms of the methods used, the entities
212 involved, as well as the characteristics of each botnet (e.g. size and impact) (see Section 4), which was achieved through
213 scientific papers and online articles available on the websites of organisations participating in the takedown operations,
214 such as law enforcement agencies (e.g. Europol), large enterprises (e.g. Microsoft), and non-profit cyber security
215 organisations (e.g. The Shadowserver Foundation). Articles on widely popular websites related to cyber security (e.g.
216 Krebs on Security), worldwide news agencies (e.g. BBC) and newspapers (e.g. The Guardian), also contributed to
217 completing this task.
218

219 Last but not least, these same resources were also utilized to examine the difficulties that surround botnet takedown
220 operations, which can be of legal, ethical, or technical nature, as well as related to the jurisdiction of the takedown
221 actors (see Section 4.3). Analysing past botnet takedowns along with the accompanying challenges of these operations,
222 provided the necessary insight needed to create the link between takedown efforts and the business models applied by
223 botnets, but also led to observations regarding the potential course of action in future takedown operations.
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227 1.4 Outline

228 The remainder of this article is as follows. At the end of this section, we present the methodology used to carry out
229 this survey. In Section 2, we give an overview of cybercrime’s evolution, darkweb marketplaces and forums, and two
230 economic models that can be applied to cybercrime operations. In Section 3, we present our implementations of the
231 *Value Chain Model* and the *Business Model Canvas*. Section 4 is dedicated to botnet takedown efforts, how they can be
232 correlated to economic models, the challenges that surround takedown operations, as well as potential future steps. In
233 Section 5, we report notable existing research on botnets, as well as on the specific topic of botnet economics. Lastly, in
234 Section 6, we summarize this survey and discuss the main takeaway points.
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238 2 CYBERCRIME AS A BUSINESS

239 In this section, we are discussing the phenomenon of cybercrime over the years, darkweb marketplace and forum
240 utilisation by cybercrime actors, their impact, as well as efforts made towards taking down these platforms.
241

242 In the earlier days of cybercrime, the communication between cybercriminals and potential clients, was mainly
243 carried out using the IRC protocol [11], [33]. IRC would serve as a marketplace where clients could visit various channels
244 and acquire the service of their choosing. Channels were also used for internal communication between the cybercrime
245 actors and aspiring hackers, some of which are still operational [33], [58]. Along with IRC channels, presently there are
246 dedicated websites and forums, which clients can simply visit through their browser, providing higher ease of access.
247 After establishing communication, further contact with the vendors, can include other means, such as the instant
248 messenger application *Wickr*, which has lately emerged as very popular, the encrypted mail service provider *ProtonMail*,
249 or other platforms such as *Google+*, *Telegram*, *ICQ*, *Facebook*, *Twitter*, *AIM*, *Jabber*, *Reddit*, *Signal*, and *WhatsApp* [36, 92].
250
251
252

253 2.1 Darkweb Marketplaces & Forums

254 The darkweb is an Internet overlay network that requires special software to access, has special configuration and
255 access authorization, and it is a subset of the Deep Web. The Deep Web can be described as every part of the Internet
256 that is not accessible to the average user and it represents around 96% of the overall Internet. Apart from providing
257 anonymity to legitimate users, the darkweb can be abused by cyber criminals to perform illegal activities as well. Over
258
259
260

Market	Icarus Market	Canada HQ	Dark0de Reborn	Deep Sea Market	White House Market	Dark Market	ToRRcZ Market	The Versus Project	Monopoly	Neptune Market	Hydra Market
Forced PGP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
2FA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Payment methods	BTC, XMR, Litecoin	BTC	BTC, XMR	BTC	BTC, XMR	BTC, XMR	BTC, XMR, Litecoin, Zcash	BTC, XMR	XMR	BTC, Litecoin, XMR	BTC

Table 1. Example of darkweb marketplace authentication mechanisms and payment methods [30].




Fig. 2. Drug vendor advertisement in the Dread forum.

the years, marketplaces [122, 123] and forums [27, 88] have been established on the darkweb, and mainly on the Tor network, where cybercriminals can take advantage of the protocol’s anonymity and obfuscation properties to conduct their operations. The anonymity provided by the darkweb works in two ways:

- **The Sellers:** Tracing sellers that are operating in the darkweb is much more challenging for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Furthermore, cybercriminals can control the level of access control they want for their marketplaces, depending on the how they advertise the onion address of their Tor hidden service [139] their marketplace is running on, what payment methods they accept (e.g. escrow [50]), which cryptocurrencies are available, like Monero (XMR) [28] and Bitcoin (BTC) [13, 79, 104], and which authentication mechanisms they implement (see Table 1). This leads to LEAs and researchers, also finding it difficult to gain access to some marketplaces, to gather and analyze data, in an effort to disrupt the marketplaces’ operation.
- **The Buyers:** Individuals interested in acquiring services from these marketplaces, can effectively maintain their identities hidden when visiting them. This makes these marketplaces more appealing to the clients by offering a sense of security against being discovered or even, in many cases, being prosecuted for breaking the law.

The darkweb’s anonymity properties extend to the forums as well, where potential buyers can discuss with former buyers, read reviews and receive guidance on ways they could go about making a purchase on the marketplaces.

2.1.1 Forums vs Marketplaces.

Forums are fundamentally different digital platforms than marketplaces². In forums, there is constant communication among members of the illegal trading community, be it sellers or buyers, with discussions on several topics, such as marketplaces, vendors, services, and payment. Furthermore, forums serve as platforms where vendors can advertise their products and services (Figure 2).

This makes forums a great place for buyers to navigate through, in an effort to find the best source offering what they need. They can read existing posts, directly ask other users, and generally use the feedback of more experienced buyers, as a guide, to make the right choices. Negative feedback will serve as a cautionary tale for future users (Figure 3).

²In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, when mentioning marketplaces, we also include vendors shops, which in truth are a more elementary version of marketplaces with far fewer features, and include products and services from a single seller [50].




Fig. 3. Dread forum discussion thread on a marketplace scam.

Marketplaces on the other hand, are where the transactions between buyers and sellers take place. This is where botmasters can list their services, providing buyers with the advantage of browsing through the available options and choosing according to their needs. On Table 2 we present some product and service examples along with their prices, but the variety is far greater, with some vendors even trading in *COVID-19* vaccines and vaccination certificates [51]. Furthermore, there are reviews and reputation systems [50] (Figure 3.2.1), available to help the buyers choose the best combination of product and vendor, depending on their needs. In some cases, marketplaces may also have dedicated forum sections (e.g. *Hydra* [89]), and some forums may offer the capability to promote, or even sell products [62], usually of limited variety. The following personal advertisement example was taken from the *Dread* forum in February 2021:

"Hey I am a black hat hacker I can write a custom made (custom made means not recognizable by anti viruses) botnet malware with root privilege access for mining crypto, ddos site, password hijack and steal user data or bank data I don't care and i wont judge. but I expect to get paid afterwards. I can design for windows macos and linux but not phones (ios android) will write the code in python so victim MUST have python preinstalled If interested PM so we talk details."

Lastly, it should also be mentioned that there is a special type of marketplace called Automated Vending Cart (AVC), which, as the name suggests, can be used to carry out automated purchases of illegal products on the darkweb, completely taking interaction with the vendors, out of the equation [57]. Some of the most popular marketplaces operating today include *Torrez* [90] and *White House Market* [91], popular forums include *Dread* [88] and *Freehacks* [27], but there are many more out there [122, 123].

2.1.2 Marketplace Takedowns.

Coordinated efforts have been successful in taking down illegal marketplaces operating in the dark web, like *Silk Road* [66], which was the first darkweb marketplace of its kind, with proof of its impact visible even to this day [60], the *Wall Street Market (WSM)* [128], *AlphaBay* and *Hansa Market* [100]. The most recent takedown is that of *DarkMarket* [17], which was considered to be the biggest illegal marketplace worldwide, operating in the darkweb, with 500,000 users, 2,400 sellers, 320,000 transactions and more than 4,650 BTC and 12,800 Monero XMR transferred, amounting to more than \$140 million at the current rate (Jan 2021). The effort was a coordinated operation of many countries involving Germany, Australia, Denmark, Moldova, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the USA, along with Europol.

2.2 Cybercrime-as-a-Service: Business Models

Since cybercrime has taken the form of a business, it is only natural that it has some common properties with legitimate businesses and follows some of the same principles. Depending on its size, different models can be applied to the way

Category	Product-Service Type	Average Price
Credit Card Data	Cloned Mastercard with PIN	\$15
	Cloned American Express with PIN	\$35
	Cloned VISA with PIN	\$25
	Credit card details, account balance up to \$1000	\$12
	Credit card details, account balance up to \$5000	\$20
	Stolen online banking logins, minimum \$100 on account	\$35
	Stolen online banking logins, minimum \$2000 on account	\$65
	UK bank log - £3,000 GBP balance	\$50
	Germany bank log - €3,500 EUR balance	\$300
Japan bank log - ¥400,000 JPY balance	\$350	
Payment Processing Services	Stolen PayPal account details, minimum \$100	\$198.56
	PayPal transfer from stolen account, \$1000 – \$3000	\$320.39
	PayPal transfers from stolen account, \$3000	\$155.94
	Western Union transfer from stolen account, above \$1000	\$98.15
Forged Documents	US driving license, average quality	\$1500
	US driving license, high quality	\$550
	Rutgers State University student ID	\$70
	US, Canada, or Europe passport	\$1500
	Europe national ID card	\$550
DDoS Attacks [114]	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 1 hour	\$10
	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 24 hours	\$60
	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 1 week	\$400
	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 1 month	\$800
	Premium protected website, 20-50k requests per second, multiple elite proxies, 24 hours	\$200

Table 2. Example of Darkweb service-product average prices in 2020 (as reported by [45, 52]).

the infrastructure of each organisation functions, describing the different components and entities that coexist and interact with one another internally. Two prime examples are the *Value Chain Model*, created by Michael Porter [108] and Alexander Osterwalder's *Business Model Canvas* [102]. Both of the models are implemented in the context of a botnet business in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

2.2.1 Value Chain Model. Porter's Value Chain Model [1, 64, 108, 133], describes a profit organisation as a system composed of activities that revolve around the production, marketing, delivery and support of a product or service. This system's ultimate goal is to provide a competitive advantage over other organisations, but it also focuses on maintaining it. It is divided into two main sets of activities: *Primary* and *Support*, with *Margin* being the outcome of the two sets' cooperation.

Primary Activities. The *primary activities* are the vital elements needed for the business to be in a position of competitive advantage, which will eventually lead to more financial profit. They are *inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing & sales, and service*.

Inbound logistics are connected to the all the activities needed to acquire the raw materials used in the production process. They also include the handling of the acquired materials, namely the warehousing and inventory control, as well as the communication between the organisation and the suppliers. In cybercrime, inbound logistics translate

417 into processes like vulnerability discovery research and communication with the suppliers of these vulnerabilities
418 [121], like hacking groups that are pouring resources into vulnerability research (e.g. networks, protocols, software,
419 applications) for exploitation and profit. They can also include the management of these vulnerabilities, after they have
420 been acquired, like inventory and updates.
421

422 *Operations* refer to processes through which the raw materials are turned into the final product or service, which
423 will subsequently be put out in the market, creating value for the organisation. In cybercrime the raw materials can be
424 vulnerabilities, making the final product the exploit kit developed.
425

426 *Outbound Logistics* include actions related to the storage, distribution and delivery of the final product to the client.
427 A cybercrime example is delivery of the final product/exploit kit to the buyers, through digital or physical means.

428 The actions associated with advertising and promoting the product/service to the customers, as well as encouraging
429 them to carry out the purchase, belong in the *marketing & sales* set of activities. In a cybercrime scenario, marketing
430 and sales can include forums where products and services can be advertised, as well as marketplaces where clients can
431 browse through and carry out purchases.
432

433 Lastly, *service* is always an important factor that can affect how successful an organisation becomes over time. It
434 describes the activities aiming at offering customer support, repairs, warranties and replacements, and it mainly takes
435 effect after a product/service has been sold. With darkweb drug trading as a cybercrime example, service can refer to
436 customer support in case of an issue, such as dispatching the wrong product or quantity of a product (e.g. drugs).
437
438

439 **Support Activities.** Having a dependable foundation, that can serve as a support system for the primary activities,
440 is of vital importance for every organisation. The *support activities* include *procurement*, *technology development*, *human*
441 *resource management*, and *firm infrastructure*, and constitute the backbone of the organisation.
442

443 *Firm infrastructure* translates into elements such as accounting, legal, and quality assurance, and is considered as the
444 supporting mechanism for all of the activities described in the model, both primary and support. In cybercrime, one
445 example element belonging in this segment would be money laundering services.
446

447 *Human resource management* includes the management of the business' personnel such as, recruitment and hire,
448 training, and lay offs. In cybercrime context, this segment could include staff management such as vulnerability
449 researchers, hackers, exploit developers, and support staff.
450

451 *Technology* refers to the hardware, software and every action performed, with the purpose of turning the raw
452 materials into the finalised product. Actions that aim towards improving the efficiency of these processes are also
453 included. An example in cybercrime would be hardware, like servers and computers, as well as software such as
454 encryption tools, password crackers, packet sniffers, communication apps, and websites.
455

456 *Procurement* describes the physical acquisition of the inputs, such as raw materials and resources, making this
457 segment the implementation of the planning executed by the inbound logistics' set of activities. In an exploit trading
458 cybercrime scenario, this segment could describe acquiring information of vulnerabilities from the researchers, or
459 exploit kits, mainly through digital means.
460

461 **Margin:** *Margin* refers to the interaction between the activities of the *Primary* and *Support* activity groups. This
462 interaction is considered as efficient when the cost of creating the service or product, which is equivalent to the cost of
463 each activity of the two groups, is lower than the price at which it is made available to the customers [78], leading
464 to profit. In cybercrime, margin would simply be the difference between the total costs of developing a vulnerability
465 exploit kit and its selling price.
466
467
468

2.2.2 Business Model Canvas.

The *Business Model Canvas* [34, 101, 102] is composed of nine building blocks. The *customer relationships*, *customer segments*, *channels* and *revenue streams* blocks, are mainly focused on the customer, while the *key partners*, *key activities*, *key resources* and *cost structure* blocks, focus on the business itself. Lastly, *value propositions* is the block that brings all of the other blocks together.

Customer Segments: This block refers to the customer groups that the business' product/service is directed towards. In cybercrime, the customer segments can include drug substance users, individuals interested in buying fire-arms, as well as individuals interested in acquiring botnet and malware related services.

Value Propositions: Value propositions describes the value exchange taking place between the business and its clients, and are in essence the products and services the business is offering, in order to satisfy the needs of a customer segment. Value propositions, in a cybercrime scenario, could refer to services such as phishing services [127] and botnet attacks [72], and products such as exploits, ransomware and illegal drugs.

Channels: The channels building block refers to the means of communication the business uses to reach the customer segments, such as digital platforms, social media, and the means used to maintain that communication, once it has been established. The purchase and delivery mechanisms, such as online sales/stores and digital/physical delivery, and after-sale support, are also included in this segment. In cybercrime context, this block can refer to darkweb marketplaces and forums, messaging and E-mail applications [36], as well as postal services [92].

Customer Relationships: Depending on the business, there is a degree of personalised business/client relationship needed, in order to acquire, keep and subsequently grow the client base. In cybercrime, relationships between vendors and buyers, can be established and maintained mainly through forums, marketplaces, and messaging/E-mail applications [36].

Revenue Streams: The method (e.g. subscription, licensing fee) and amount of payment, that the clients are willing to provide to acquire the product/service offered by the business, belong in the revenue streams block. One-time purchases (e.g. phishing kits [109]), subscriptions (e.g. phishing services [127]) and commissions, such as money laundering services [112], are all cybercrime examples for the activities related to revenue streams.

Key Resources: This block describes all the resources needed for a business, to be able to accomplish its goals, such as office space, hosting servers, computers, staff and Internet access. In cybercrime, this building block can refer to hardware like servers and computers, internet access, software, like operating systems, web applications, Virtual Private Network (VPN) software, communication applications, and staff for the different parts of the operation.

Key Activities: Key activities are the essential activities that the organisation needs to focus on and prioritise, to be operational and able to produce maximum results, such as production (e.g. factory), problem solving (e.g. hospital), marketing and advertising, and maintenance. Some cybercrime examples are drug sales, attack execution (e.g. DDoS attack), exploit and malware sales, as well as advertising on forums. Furthermore, finding a way to breach a target's security system, by the request of a client, qualifies as problem solving and is included in this building block as well.

Key Partners: In addition to suppliers, working with partners can lead to mutual profit, making it an important stepping stone in order to reach higher levels of growth. Some examples of partners to cybercriminals can be vulnerability researchers and hackers, malware and exploit kit developers, and illegal drug manufacturers.

521 *Cost Structure*: This last block refers to all the core costs that are associated with the business' operation. In cybercrime,
522 this building block can include hardware maintenance costs, staff salaries, vulnerability research, exploit kit development
523 costs (in the case of an internal department), and hiring fees (in the case of external associates).
524

525 3 APPLYING BUSINESS MODELS TO BOTNETS

526
527 The fact that the darkweb is so effective at obfuscating the identities of its users, has made it the perfect marketplace
528 for botnets. Furthermore, the increased popularity of e-coins, and especially BTC and XMR, has contributed towards
529 developing the botnet economy structure into a successful business that provides anonymity to its clients. Therefore,
530 botnets present similarities in their financial functionality, to legitimate businesses, with economic models being
531 composed of common elements. This can be accomplished by mapping out their business' infrastructure according
532 to specific economic models, which can be further customized depending on how the botmaster envisions running
533 their organisation. In Section 2.2, we discussed two well-known business models, namely the *Value Chain Model* and
534 the *Business Model Canvas*, and how they can be applied into the cybercrime context. In this section, we map out the
535 various elements of a botnet organisation through the utilization of the two aforementioned economic models.
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537
538

539 3.1 Setting Up A Botnet

540
541 A preliminary step that must be executed independently from the economic model of choice, is the initial set up of the
542 botnet. The foundation for the creation of every botnet, is the malware. The botmasters, in many cases, are not the
543 actual developers of the botnet software [113], which means that they need to acquire the malware they will build their
544 organisation on. At this point they have two choices [62]. The first choice is buying (or renting) an established botnet.
545 This option offers more ease for users not as technically competent, but since the botnet is already fully developed, its
546 purpose is already assigned and the botmaster must choose accordingly (e.g. spam botnet or credential theft botnet). In
547 this scenario the buyer is provided with the C&C server's information and is also given administrator's access. The
548 second option is buying a botnet framework [97]. This option includes only the bot application, that is used to infect
549 hosts and further expand the bot army, and the C&C server application. This option is more suitable for users with
550 technical proficiency and offers much more flexibility, by allowing the buyer to develop and personalise the botnet
551 according to their specific needs. In this scenario, the buyer also has the advantage of the seller not knowing the
552 information of the C&C server, which is the case when buying an already established botnet. An additional step to the
553 framework option and in the case where the botmaster is the developer, is the fact that they will have to independently
554 acquire BPHS [6, 54, 62] (see Section 3.2.1), while an already set up botnet, will often be accompanied by these services.
555
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558

559 3.2 Value Chain Model

560
561 This section is dedicated to illustrating how the Value Chain Model can map into the economic infrastructure of a
562 botnet, both in the scenario where the botnet is made available to clients as a service or product (CaaS), and in the
563 scenario the botnet is only serving the botmaster's own personal agenda. To accommodate for this differentiation
564 between the two cases, along with the specific nature of a botnet as a business, we propose a new implementation (see
565 Figure 4) of the original value chain model (c.f. Section 2.2), which aims at providing a more accurate illustration of the
566 different factors that play a role in the economic ecosystem of a botnet.
567

568 Our adapted model presents changes in the *inbound logistics*, *operations*, *outbound logistics*, and *marketing & sales*
569 segments from the *primary activities* group (in blue), as well as the *procurement* segment from the *support activities*
570 group (in orange). In specific, operations, as described in Section 2.2.1, do not have a place in the model, due to the fact
571
572




Fig. 4. Botnet Value Chain Model (adapted from the original [1, 64, 108, 133], see also Section 2.2.1). The elements preceded by an asterisk refer to the parts of the segments that are removed if the botnet is only used privately by the botmasters, to serve their own personal agenda.

that there is no actual production procedure, transforming the raw materials into the final products, while outbound logistics have a very restricted role due to the nature of a botnet business. For these two reasons, we implement a new segment in the primary activities, called *Execution*, which replaces both of these blocks and contributes towards a more compact application of the model. In addition, the procurement block is removed from the support activities and merged with inbound logistics (see Section 2.2.1), resulting in the new block *Assimilation*. The reasoning behind this adjustment is the fact that due to the nature of the business, there is no need for a separate block describing the physical acquisition of the raw materials, namely the bots. After the infection of the host, the bots automatically join the network (raw material acquisition), through the coordination mechanism already implemented in the bot binary. Lastly, the marketing and sales segment is renamed into *Monetization*, and repurposed to more accurately describe how the botnet operations can create revenue for the botmaster, both in the presence and absence of a client segment.

3.2.1 Primary Activities. The primary activities of a botnet business are *assimilation*, *execution*, *monetization* and *service*.

Assimilation: *Assimilation* can be summarized as all the activities performed behind establishing a healthy bot supply. Having a healthy supply of bots is vital for every bot network. From time to time, bots may go offline and leave the botnet permanently. The botmaster needs to keep the desired number of bots, at a healthy level, so they need to plan ahead. Bolstering the ranks of the bot army, or simply maintaining a steady number of bots, is a priority, and it can be achieved through propagation mechanisms 1, by acquiring Pay-per-Install (PPI) [19] services, and by purchasing individual bots and “bundles” that include a large number of bots, which can then be used according to the botmaster’s vision about the organisation [9, 62].

Apart from the rank bolstering methods, the exact mechanism that is tasked with coordinating the bots, after their creation, is also a crucial part of the assimilation block. In a hybrid or centralised architecture, coordination is achieved

625 through the “phone home” function of the bots. This mechanism is used by every bot for the connection to the C&C
626 server, after which they become part of the bot army. It can be based on domain name usage, IPs, Domain Generation
627 Algorithm (DGA)s [71], the blockchain [48], or Tor hidden services [7]. In the case the botnet is following a P2P
628 architecture, coordination is achieved through the peer communication with the other nodes of the network [56, 143].
629 Depending on which of these mechanisms are implemented, as well as the botnet’s architecture, botmasters need
630 to acquire the services of domain registrars, in case the botnet is utilising the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol
631 as part of the coordination mechanism or backup channel, but most importantly establishing a C&C server (hybrid
632 or centralised architecture). The fact that C&C servers are the most important component of these types of botnets,
633 renders securing them to as high a degree as possible imperative. For that reason botmasters acquire BPHSs [6, 54] for
634 their servers. These services can also serve as storage for harvested credentials and dump sites for files, exploit kits, and
635 malware. Furthermore they are very often provided along with the purchase of already established botnets, otherwise
636 they must be acquired by the botmaster independently.
637
638
639

640 Securing the different components of the botnet infrastructure is essential. For this reason, botmasters must implement
641 evasion mechanisms [71, 124], such as *Fast Fluxing*, *Domain Fluxing* and, in case of a botnet utilising the Tor network,
642 *Tor Fluxing* [7]. In case these mechanisms fail to provide the necessary obfuscation, and a takedown effort from LEAs is
643 successful, there must be a secondary operation mechanism to fall back on. For example, a very common takedown
644 attempt against hybrid or centralised botnets, is cutting off the communication between the C&C server(s) and the bots
645 (see Section 4). Hence the secondary mechanism could include having a secondary C&C server, or multiple backup
646 servers, so if a number of servers goes offline, others may take its place, and the botnet can remain fully functional.
647
648

649 Cooperation with other botmasters, is also a part of the backup mechanism, which in case of an emergency (e.g.
650 takedown effort from LEAs), can be used to help regain control of the botnet, and can contribute towards the overall
651 resilience of the botnet against hostile actions (see Section 4.1.14). Such collaborations can also lead to more financial
652 gain by providing assistance and effectiveness in the botnet’s operations, like in the case of the *TrickBot* (see Section
653 4.1.14) and *Emotet* (see Section 4.1.15) botnets, where the latter, after the infection of a host, would sometimes drop the
654 *TrickBot* malware as well.
655
656

657 *Execution:* The execution segment refers to all of the activities that take place after the client has paid to acquire
658 a product or service, the delivery after a sale or rental, and the attack execution. In the scenario of a botnet rental,
659 the delivery can be interpreted as providing the buyer with access to the C&C server. Being the backbone of every
660 centralised or hybrid botnet infrastructure, gaining access to this server essentially means gaining full control of a part
661 of the botnet or even the whole infrastructure. This process can be carried out simply by providing the C&C server’s
662 IP, domain name or onion address, and login credentials, namely the username and password [62], though secure
663 communication channels established by the botmaster (see Section 2). Afterwards, the user can easily utilise the botnet
664 through the user interface of the C&C server.
665
666

667 In the scenario of a botnet sale, the process of giving control of the network over to the client, is equivalent to safely
668 proving them with the botmaster application, along with the C&C server information, in the case of an existing central
669 point of control.
670

671 If the client is only interested in acquiring botnet services, the execution segment refers to delivering these services.
672 Some examples are carrying out malware installs on hosts (PPI), or delivering stolen credentials harvested by the bots,
673 through safe communication channels (2). In a DDoS attack scenario, this would translate into executing the actual
674 attack, according to the clients’ choice of attack type (e.g. ICMP flood, SYN flood), and attack target. These choices can
675
676

Rank	Items Sold
Rank 0	0-9
Rank 1	10-99
Rank 2	100-199
Rank 3	200-299
Rank 4	300-399
Rank 5	400-499
Rank 6	500-599
Rank 7	600-699
Rank 8	700-799
Rank 9	800-899
Rank 10	900-999
Top Seller	from 1000


Fig. 5. Torrez marketplace vendor reputation system.

be made either entirely by the client or in collaboration with the botmaster, namely against a specific IP/specific type chosen by the client, or an attack against a corporation in general, where the botmaster would be tasked with deciding on the optimal attack details, in order to achieve maximum impact.

In the case the botmaster is not following the CaaS model, the delivery to the clients, namely the C&C server credentials and botmaster application, has no place in the segment. Despite the absence of clients, the attack execution, along with the attack type and target, still play a vital role in the revenue generating process. However, in this case, the selection of the optimal attack type and target combination, is solely performed by the botmaster, depending on their purposes and vision. These attacks can be DDoS extortion [3], ransomware extortion [141], banking fraud/credential theft [71] and cryptojacking [37, 96].

Monetization: The main method of advertising botnet services [113, 127], is through darkweb forums [27, 88] and marketplaces [122, 123] (see Section 2.1). In marketplaces botmasters can list the services they can provide (Figure 7), such as selling parts of their network, renting them and providing various types of attacks. Buyers can then easily browse through the available choices, and acquire what they desire. The main function of forums, is to provide a platform where discussions can take place between individuals interested in services provided in the darkweb. An important mechanism that ought to be mentioned, is the *support* mechanism that the majority of marketplaces implement. Users not satisfied with a product or vendor in general, can use this function to report their experience to the marketplace administrators (e.g. in the case of a scam as shown in Figure 3).

This mechanism combined with the reviews and feedback of previous buyers available on the forums and marketplaces, leads to reputation and trust playing a crucial role in the way a botmaster's business is going to evolve and establish itself in the world of illegal trading. There are even dedicated sites, that function as a database of vendors that have performed scams in the past [134], the so-called "*rippers*". Negative feedback will lead to buyers not trusting the vendor to come through and deliver what was advertised to the expected quality. In some cases, there is no delivery at all. For that exact reason, marketplaces have implemented reputation systems for vendors [50], to provide a sense of security to potential buyers. Some examples are ranks (Figure 5), which usually range from a scale of 1 to 10, depending on the numbers of sales that a vendor has carried out, and marketplace verification levels, according to which each vendor gains one level for each marketplace that they have been verified by, attesting to their legitimacy. An example of this reputation system is showcased on Figure 6, where a vendor from the *Torrez* marketplace has been verified by

Market	Number of Deals	Rating
 Avaris	55	93.33%
 Berlusconi Market	256	90.48%
 CRYPTONIA MARKET <small>Walletless, Instant, Simple and Secure</small>	148	95.35%
 DarkMarket	82	99.9%
 EmpireMarket	4662	95.63%
 OLYMPUS	8	n/a
 RAPTURE	236	n/a
 Wall 1st Market	2573	n/a
 WHM	220	93.2%

EUCarder - Rank 9 Verification Level 9	
On ToRReZ Market Since:	Sep 1, 2020
Last Login	Mar 1, 2021
Total Amount Of Transactions	910
Total Feedback Received	233
Positive Feedback Received Ratio	90.99% (212)
Negative Feedback Received Ratio	6.44% (15)
Disputes Total:	38
Disputes Won:	44.74% (17)
Disputes Lost:	7.89% (3)
Finalize Early	Available (can require)

Fig. 6. Vendor reputation example in the Torrez marketplace. *Left*: Vendor profile example, including the reputation metrics. *Right*: List of marketplaces that have verified the specific vendor.

9 marketplaces (on the right - the total number of sales, along with the reputation score achieved on each of these platforms, are also included), and has consequently gained the verification level 9, which is publicly visible on their vendor profile (on the left). Additionally, as illustrated on the same figure, client feedback/reviews, dispute resolution statistics (complaint tickets created by unsatisfied clients), as well as whether the vendor has the *Finalize Early*³ badge, also affect the reputation of a vendor. Through these systems, buyers can differentiate between established and more recent sellers, that have a higher chance of being scammers. Figure 7 is an example of service listings on the *Torrez* marketplace. One can notice the service provided, such as DDoS attacks and tutorials, the service category, whether the product is digital (e.g. tutorial PDF file), whether the delivery is instant, the country of origin, payment method supported, which is either escrow or multisignature escrow [50], the price, and the accepted currencies (e.g. Monero (XMR), Bitcoin (BTC) and Litecoin (LTC)). Lastly each listing includes the vendor profile information, which is their name, number of carried out sales, as well as their verification level, rank, and number of positive/neutral/negative reviews received by previous buyers. A detailed overview of reputation systems, currencies used, as well as payment schemes found on darkweb marketplaces, is presented by *Georgoulis et al.* [50].

Depending on the course of action that the botmaster has taken while designing the infrastructure and their personal goals, a botnet can provide income through a number of methods. All of these methods are also a part of the marketing and sales segment of the model. The botnet can be sold as a whole or as separate parts, it can be rented and it can provide services. These services can vary [61] from one-time purchases (e.g. a single DDoS attack, account credentials) [72]) and PPI (e.g. malware) [19], to services that follow the Pay-per-Click (PPC) (e.g. traffic redirection [53]) and subscription models (e.g. botnet rental [62] and phishing services [127]).

If the botnet is not aiming to satisfy the needs of a customer group, promoting, advertising, selling, renting and providing services on marketplaces and forums, along with the pricing methods, have no application in the model. The botmaster in this case can create revenue through the ransoms gained out of extortion practises, as DDoS extortion [3]

³Marketplaces award the Finalize Early to highly trusted vendors, allowing them to provide services without utilizing the escrow payment mechanism, for speed and ease when carrying out sales [50].















781		DDoS Miet Service 72 hours for 499.90€	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM <input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	\$595.88 (€499.90)	happyseller1 (199) (85/3/5)
782		Category: All Items > Carded Items		Buy Now	Rank 2 ✓
783		ESCROW: 			
784		BLACKNET V3+ V3.5 (EXTREME ADVANCED BOTNET)	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM <input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	\$7.99	youngmoney (366) (126/1/1)
785		Category: All Items > Tutorials and e-books > Money		Buy Now	Rank 4 ✓
786		ESCROW: 			
787		Endgame 7 days tutorial for how to create a botnet	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM	\$500.00	fraudbuddy (324) (104/5/19)
788		Category: All Items > Fraud > CVV & Credit Cards > Carding Guides	<input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	Buy Now	Rank 4 ✓
789		From United States			
790		ESCROW: 			
791		GhostSquad DDOS + Botnet Tools	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM <input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	\$0.99	DrunkDragon (3487) (851/46/41)
792		Category: All Items > Software & Malware > Botnets		Buy Now	TOP ✓
793		MULTISIG:  ESCROW: 			
794		BLACKNET V3+ V3.5 (EXTREME ADVANCED BOTNET)	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM <input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	\$7.99	youngmoney (366) (126/1/1)
795		Category: All Items > Tutorials and e-books > Money		Buy Now	Rank 4 ✓
796		ESCROW: 			
797		▶ BOTNET ◀ PACK + GUIDE cheapest of all time in all	<input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL ITEM <input type="checkbox"/> INSTANT DELIVERY	\$14.00	EmpireShop (504) (128/5/17)
798		Category: All Items > Fraud		Buy Now	Rank 6 ✓
799		From United States			
800		MULTISIG:  ESCROW: 			

Fig. 7. Torrez marketplace botnet services.

and ransomware extortion [141]. They can also carry out banking fraud/credential theft [71] and cryptojacking [37, 96], which are two methods that can provide direct profit.

Service: The *service* segment translates into activities meant to provide support to the customers of the botnet enterprise. It includes handling issues linked to customer needs, both before and after the purchase or rental of a service. One example is technical assistance in the operation of the C&C server (in case of a rental). This segment also affects the reputation of the botmaster as a vendor, which leads to future clients showing trust and choosing them over other vendors.

If the botmaster is privately utilising his resources, the service segment, namely the customer support, does not have a place in the model.

3.2.2 Support Activities.

Firm Infrastructure: One of the components of the *firm infrastructure* block, is the legal approach of the C&C server's geolocation. The effectiveness of BPHS is heavily dependant on this geolocation. Countries differ in the way that they handle various activities of questionable legality in the cyber space, making some more suitable [54]) than others, to establish a C&C server. Hence, to deal with this state, there is a degree of legal consulting and research needed, which must be recurring, in order to accommodate for potential changes in the legal framework of countries that are either already hosting C&C servers, or that could do so in the future. Furthermore, another variable that could affect which geolocation of the C&C servers, would be optimal, is the possible attack surface. Having the C&C servers and the attack target of the botnet in different countries, is bound to make takedown efforts even more challenging, by being under

833 different jurisdictions, requiring the cooperation and coordination of multiple LEAs and countries. For instance, it
834 would be preferable for a botnet, mainly operating in the U.S, to have its C&C servers hosted in Europe or Asia).

835 Successful botnet operations, result in revenue, which cannot be justified to the authorities. This leads to botmasters
836 having to either acquire already established *money laundering* services, or to create their own personal money laundering
837 network by employing “*money mules*” [15, 23, 43, 86, 147]. Through these two options they can “*launder*” their money,
838 which in essence means making the money earned through cybercrime activities untraceable and not able to be
839 associated with their illegal operation.
840

841 In the botnet business, there is constant need for new ways to breach the security of host systems, so that an oncoming
842 infection can take place and the target host can join the botnet. Hence, the infrastructure set of activities can also
843 include activities aiming at acquiring new means of effectively bypassing system security, which can be accomplished
844 through collaboration with vulnerability researchers, as well as malware and exploit kit developers [14].
845

846 Lastly, infrastructure also includes activities related to the maintenance of the botnet, such as the equipment/hardware
847 used by the actors and software updates.
848

849 *Human Resource Management: Human resource management*, handles all the issues related to the staff, such as hires,
850 lay-offs and payment of the organisation’s personnel. The personnel can include various roles, such as operation
851 of the C&C server, attack execution, customer support, individuals charged with operating the vendor profiles of
852 the marketplaces on which the products/services are listed, and individuals tasked with advertising [113, 127] those
853 products/services on several forums. Staff also includes individuals that deal with the technical needs of the botnet,
854 such as hardware maintenance and software updates. In the case of the organisation having its own money laundering
855 service, managing that group also belongs in this segment.
856

857 If the botmaster is not operating under the CaaS model, the elements that are redacted from the segment, are the
858 advertisers, marketplace profile operators, and customer support staff.
859

860 *Technology: Technology*, refers to the hardware and software necessary for the botnet’s operation, optimal perfor-
861 mance, and maintenance. In terms of software, technology can include the botnet applications, namely the application
862 running on the C&C server, the application running on each infected host, and the botmaster application, Virtual
863 Private Network applications (VPNs), cryptocurrency wallets (Table 1), software that allows for connections to the TOR
864 network, and communication applications like *Signal*, *Wickr* and *ProtonMail* (see Section 2.1). Concerning the hardware,
865 technology incorporates all of the devices utilized for the botnet’s operation, with the main ones being workstations
866 and servers (DNS and C&C). Additionally, since the technology block includes the botnet applications, it is bound to
867 also include actions which revolve around locating new vulnerabilities, developing new exploit kits, and improving on
868 the existing botnet software. As mentioned above, this can also be achieved through the collaboration with third-part
869 actors [14].
870

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874
875 3.2.3 *Margin*. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the cost of carrying out the activities in the primary and support activity
876 groups, needs to be lower than the price the products or services are offered at, to create positive margin. The same
877 principle applies to botnets.
878

879 3.3 Business Model Canvas

880 In this section, we describe the application of the Business Model Canvas to a botnet organisation (Figure 8). As
881 discussed in Section 3.2, there is need to differentiate between the two distinct cases of the botnet being directed
882
883




Fig. 8. Botnet Business Model Canvas (adapted from [131]). The elements preceded by an asterisk, refer to the parts of the segments that are removed in the case the botmaster is utilising the botnet privately, to serve their own personal agenda.

towards a clientele, and the case it is not. The same principles apply in this implementation as well, with all of the segments being affected. The components of the canvas can be divided into two distinct categories. The *right* (orange) side describes who the value created by the business is directed towards, how it is generated, and how it is delivered. The *left* (blue) side is focused on fulfilling the necessary requirements needed for the right side to achieve its goals. The *value propositions* segment (red) describes what the value that the business creates is (see Section 2.2.2), and sits in the middle of the canvas, acting as a link between the two sides.

3.3.1 Customer Segments: The *customer segments* of a botnet enterprise, can range from businesses interested in advertising their products or services (e.g. spam mails), corporations aiming at gaining an advantage over rivals (e.g. disruption through DDoS attacks), and ransomware developers that are trying to spread their malware, to governments and security agencies, aiming at disrupting opposing factions, but also at increasing their influence on the cyber digital world. In the absence of clients, this segment is removed in its entirety.

3.3.2 Value Propositions: The *value propositions* building block, refers to all the services and products (see Section 3.2.1), the botmaster will be able to provide to their clients, namely the customer segments. It is heavily dependant on the purposes (see Section 1) that the botnet can serve, and customer group that the products/services are directed towards (see Section 3.3.1).

A botmaster not having interest in providing their services to clients, translates into the removal of botnet sales and rentals, as mechanisms that the botnet creates value through. These mechanisms are replaced by DDoS extortion [3], ransomware extortion [141], banking fraud/credential theft [71] and cryptojacking [37, 96], which are all attacks performed privately by the botmaster themselves.

937 3.3.3 *Channels*: *Channels* refer to the utilisation of marketplaces (see Section 3.2.1) as a platform to showcase the
938 business' products/services and carry out sales, but it also includes the means used in the communication with the
939 clients, along with the delivery methods of the services and products. Botmasters, as illustrated in Section 2, use a
940 variety of communication applications to stay in contact with their clientele, as well as forums to advertise their services
941 and come in contact with potential clients. Delivery methods, due to the nature of the business and service, are mainly
942 limited to digital means. Purchasing or renting a part of the infrastructure, would translate into gaining access to
943 the C&C servers (see Section 3.2.1), while in a credential purchase scenario, the credentials would be sent via the
944 communication applications of choice (see Section 2). In the case of a buyer acquiring a botnet service such as a DDoS
945 attack or a PPC service, the delivery is the successful attack execution itself, or the increase in incoming traffic/website
946 visits, respectively.
947
948

949 The lack of customer segments (see Section 3.3.1) from the organisation's operations, results to the channels segment
950 being removed in its entirety.
951

952 3.3.4 *Customer Relationships*: As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, reputation and trust, play a crucial role in this type of
953 enterprise, and greatly affect its impact on the darkweb market. Hence, every botmaster strives towards maintaining
954 their reputation, not only through delivering the products and services as promised, but by inspiring trust to their clients,
955 through cultivating and preserving a personalised relationship. The degree of personalisation will differ, depending on
956 the client type (e.g. one time buyer, frequent buyer), and it will serve as stepping stone to achieving good marketplace
957 rankings and positive reviews, a concept in common with legitimate businesses.
958

959 Customer relationships are removed entirely from the model if there are no customer segments (see Section 3.3.1).
960
961

962 3.3.5 *Revenue Streams*: Botmasters can achieve profit following a number of pricing models for their services, depending
963 on the nature of their botnet (see Section 3.2.1). The most widely used models are one-time purchases, PPC, PPI and
964 subscription.
965

966 If the botmaster is neither renting nor selling the botnet, and they are not providing botnet services to customers, the
967 revenue streams mentioned above, are replaced by streams originating from DDoS extortion [3], ransomware extortion
968 [141], banking fraud/credential theft [71] and cryptojacking [37, 96], namely extortion ransoms, stolen bank credential
969 use, and mined cryptocurrency respectively.
970

971 3.3.6 *Key Resources*: The *key resources* building block, describes all the necessary assets required for the business
972 to operate efficiently. These assets can be the bot malware applications, personnel, software, hardware, networking
973 and more importantly, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, the bots, along with the C&C servers and all the coordination
974 mechanism components.
975

976 The only change to the components of this segment, in the case of no customer segments, is an alteration to the
977 personnel of the organisations, namely the personnel associated with marketplaces, forums, advertising and customer
978 support (see Section 3.2.2).
979

980 3.3.7 *Key Activities*: The key activities that a botnet business needs to excel at are related to the malware's propaga-
981 tion, bot assimilation and coordination, evasion and recovery, satisfying customer needs, attack execution, delivery,
982 marketing/advertising, and maintenance. These are the priorities that the botmaster must set, in order for their business
983 to reach the highest performance possible, leading to more revenue. As analysed in Section 3.2.1, spreading the malware
984 to new hosts and assimilating more bots into the "army", leads the botnet to a state, where it can be used effectively as
985 a product or service. This is the foundation of the organisation's profits, which the main operational goal and profit
986
987
988

989 source of the botnet, namely making profit through botnet sales, rentals, and services, depends on. Consequently, sales,
990 rentals, and services, also belong in this block, accompanied by the delivery of credentials or apps, as discussed in
991 Section 3.2.1. Additionally, part of this segment, are also the processes of attack type and target selection (see Section
992 3.2.1). The effectiveness and impact of each attack's execution, will be a determining factor, in establishing a level of
993 reputation and trust for the organisation (e.g. bring a site offline by performing a DDoS attack of the optimal magnitude).
994 As illustrated in Section 3.2.1, reputation plays a leading role in the growth of the enterprise, making marketing and
995 advertising, another key activity the organisation must prioritise on [113, 127]. Lastly, the botmaster, as discussed in
996 Section 3.2.1 needs to have evasion and fail safe mechanisms in place, to make it as challenging as possible for attackers
997 to hinder their operations, and be able to recover in case an attempt is successful.
998
999

1000 Activities related to the sale or rental of the botnet, providing botnet services to clients, along with advertising in
1001 marketplaces and forums, are not included in the segment, in the absence of customer segments (see Section 3.3.1).
1002 Since the botmaster is the only one orchestrating the attacks and reaping the profits, they are in charge of selecting
1003 the targets of the attacks, as well as the type of attack that is best suited, depending on the context of each operation.
1004 As discussed in Section 3.3.5, in this case the attacks can be DDoS extortion [3], ransomware extortion [141], banking
1005 fraud/credential theft [71] and cryptojacking [37, 96].
1006
1007

1008 **3.3.8 Key Partners:** Having the right partners can provide ease of operation and efficiency to a business. The same
1009 principle applies to botnets. Increasing the revenue of an organisation is certainly affected by choosing the optimal
1010 associates for every business compartment. These associates can be of varying legality. In botnets, this translates into
1011 choosing the marketplaces that will serve the botnet's goals best, forums to advertise and promote the botnet's services
1012 [113, 127], a money laundering network, legal counseling, BPHS, PPI service providers, other botmasters (see Section
1013 3.2.1), vulnerability researchers, and lastly malware and exploit kit developers (see Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2). The last two
1014 types of partners, namely the vulnerability researchers and malware/exploit kit developers, can be a vital component of
1015 the organisation, assuring that botnet will keep evolving by being more and more effective at breaching host systems,
1016 making it both more profitable and more elusive, since defenders have to adapt yet again, in order to deal with the new
1017 version of the malware.
1018
1019
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1021 If the botmasters are utilising their resources privately, the only change in the partners segment is the redaction of
1022 marketplaces, since there is no longer a need to advertise or promote the organisation, to attract potential clients.
1023

1024 **3.3.9 Cost Structure:** This last building block describes the overall cost that is required in order to fully support the
1025 operation of each and every business segment. It includes the costs associated with staff salaries, external partner fees,
1026 namely marketplace commissions [61, 135] and money laundering commissions [61], Research and Development (R&D),
1027 BPHS and PPI service providers, and lastly maintenance costs.
1028

1029 Lastly, having no association with customers, results in the cost structure of the organisation, no longer including
1030 marketplace commissions as a component, since marketplaces are not a part of the botnet ecosystem (see Section 3.3.8).
1031

1032 An interesting point to be made, is regarding the raw materials of a botnet business. Raw materials play a leading role
1033 in every business's plan of operation. Having a never ending source of raw materials, namely bots, can be extremely
1034 valuable and can provide ease, both financial and operational, and independence to the organisation.
1035

1036 3.4 Discussion

1037 In both models, one can notice similarities in some of their building blocks. These blocks may differ in title, but in
1038 essence they describe the same functions, either individually, or in combination with others. One example is the *value*
1039

1041 *propositions* (see Section 3.3.2) and *revenue streams* (see Section 3.3.5) building blocks from the *business model canvas*
1042 (Figure 8), in comparison with the *monetization* segment (see Section 3.2) from the *value chain model* (Figure 4). The
1043 components of the two business model canvas blocks, are all described, among others, in the monetization segment.
1044 These similarities are proof that no matter the business model utilised, the most important element regarding both
1045 implementations, is how each individual building block is affected by the botmaster’s vision, and then consequently, in
1046 turn affects the content of the other blocks, forming the final economic infrastructure of the organisation.
1047
1048

1049 4 BOTNET TAKEDOWNS & BUSINESS MODELS

1050 In this section, our main focus is on successful botnet takedown efforts over the years, in regards to business models.
1051 Specifically, we will be illustrating how the mechanisms targeted by these efforts, can be mapped to segments of the
1052 business models showcased in Section 3, and then discuss the challenges related to takedown attempts.
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1056 4.1 Botnet Takedowns and Disruptions

1057 In this section we go over some of the most notable takedowns through the years, dating all the way back to 2008, and
1058 then discuss the various challenges that cyber defense actors are met with, when mounting takedown and disruption
1059 attempts.
1060
1061

1062 In the context of this paper, domain seizure and domain preregistering, as well as peer injection and peerlist poisoning,
1063 are considered as sinkholing methods, describing different processes individually, but providing very similar results.
1064
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1066 **4.1.1 Mariposa.** *Mariposa*, was a botnet originating from Spain that gained attention in 2009. It is estimated to have
1067 spread from 10 to 12 million devices, with active devices ranging from 900,000 to 1.1 million daily, and its main purposes
1068 were credential harvesting and PPI services. The botmaster utilised a central C&C server, to which they would connect
1069 using VPN software. In order to counter the threat, the *Mariposa Working Group* was formed, which managed to sinkhole
1070 the domains (seizure) used in the botnet’s infrastructure. What is interesting at this point, is the way the botmaster
1071 managed to gain back control of the botnet. They bribed an employee of the registrar they were using to register their
1072 domain names, to help them reestablish control over the bots. The bots had kept attempting to connect to the C&C
1073 server through the sinkholed domains, so when these domain became available again, the botmaster gained control
1074 once more and was able to update the bots with new C&C domain names. The most important factor that eventually
1075 led to the botmaster’s arrest, was a simple mistake from his side, after the domains were sinkholed. He attempted to
1076 connect to the C&C server without using the VPN software, giving away his Internet Protocol (IP) address, which led
1077 to his identification and arrest by the Spanish authorities [31, 89, 132].
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1081 **4.1.2 Grum.** *Grum* was considered as the third largest spam botnet in 2012, along with *Lethic* and *Pushdo/Cutwail*. It is
1082 estimated to have had around 560,000 to 840,000 infected computers under the command of the botmasters in 2010,
1083 which in that year translated into 39.9 billion spam messages, almost 26% of the overall spam volume worldwide. Bots
1084 utilised hardcoded IP addresses to coordinate with the main and secondary C&C servers, which contributed towards
1085 the uncovering of their geolocation by researchers from *FireEye*, a cyber-security company. Through the cooperation of
1086 ISPs located in Russia, Panama and the Netherlands, which were providing hosting services to Grum, the servers were
1087 shutdown. The botmasters then tried setting up a backup channel in Ukraine, but these servers were shortly shut down
1088 as well, bringing the botnet down [75, 98].
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1093 4.1.3 *Conficker*. The *Conficker* worm was an immense cyber threat in 2008 and 2009, with millions of infected
1094 computers. Its purposes were spam and spreading malware that imitated antivirus software. The threat was so large,
1095 that at some point *Microsoft* resorted to offering a reward of \$250,000 for any information on the individuals responsible
1096 for the botnet's operation, which has still not been collected to date [115]. *Microsoft* also created the *Conficker Working*
1097 *Group (CWG)*, which along partners from the private sector, such as *Facebook*, *Cisco*, *IBM*, *Verisign* and many domain
1098 registrars and registries, with non-profit groups such as *The Shadowserver Foundation* and *Internet Corporation for*
1099 *Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)*, constituted the task force that took up the task of taking the botnet down [55].
1100 The takedown efforts, which were the outcome of the cooperation between a large number of countries, were successful
1101 through reverse-engineering the malware and gaining insight on the DGA's properties. Recreating the DGA allowed
1102 for the 50,000 domains, that the bots could potentially use daily to connect to the C&C servers, to be preregistered,
1103 making them unavailable for the botnet to utilise, which resulted in loss of bot control by the botmasters [99].
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1105
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1107 4.1.4 *Citadel*. *Citadel* was creating revenue for the botmasters through bank account credential theft. It is estimated
1108 that the botnets stole over \$500 million, with infected devices reaching 5 million, and spanning over 90 countries. A part
1109 of why the network managed to reach such a high number of infections, was the fact that the cybercriminals behind
1110 *Citadel* were distributing pirated Windows Operating System (OS) versions, in which the malware was embedded. In
1111 2013, after the cooperation of law enforcement, tech companies and banks, from over 80 countries, with main actors
1112 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and *Microsoft*, the *Citadel* network of botnets was brought down, after seizing
1113 the network's servers [10, 116].
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1116

1117 4.1.5 *Shylock*. The *Shylock* botnet's activity was noticed for the first time in 2011. It was a banking trojan with
1118 credential harvesting capabilities, targeting clients of several banks, located all around the world, but with most
1119 infections taking place in the UK. It is estimated to have infected at least 30,000 devices running the Windows OS up
1120 until 2014, when its operation was disrupted. Through the cooperation of both law enforcement organisations, such as
1121 *Europol's European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)*, the *FBI*, and UK's *National Crime Agency (NCA)* and private organisations,
1122 such as *Dell SecureWorks* and *Kaspersky Lab*, the C&C servers, as well as the domains used by the bots to connect to
1123 these servers, were seized, which led to the botnet's disruption [40, 68].
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1127 4.1.6 *GameOverZeus*. *GameOver Zeus* was a botnet utilising the *Zeus* malware kit [69] and is considered as one of
1128 the most successful botnets. At its peak, it managed to spread to over one million devices and caused more than \$100
1129 million in losses. Its main purpose was banking and other credential theft, and it spread through spam e-mails and
1130 phishing messages. The efforts towards its takedown began in 2014, led by the *FBI*, under the title "*Operation Tovar*", and
1131 focused on disrupting the coordination mechanism of the botnet. The plan firstly included injecting law enforcement
1132 controlled nodes in the botnet, in order to poison the peerlist and replace the legitimate nodes with the injected ones
1133 [142], redirecting the bots to sinkhole-nodes. One more mechanism that stood in the way of the takedown, was the
1134 backup channel the botmasters had in place, which was based on the use of a DGA. This channel was dealt with before
1135 carrying out the takedown, and it was achieved through preregistering the domain names that would be generated by
1136 the bots, to reestablish communication with the C&C server in case of a takedown attempt. Subsequently, through the
1137 cooperation of Internet Service Provider (ISP)s, the nodes of the network that were acting as proxies between the C&C
1138 server and the bots, were disabled, severing the communication. Lastly, they injected a new node which replaced the
1139 C&C server, giving over control of the botnet to the takedown actors [95].
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1145 4.1.7 *Ramnit*. *Ramnit* was a botnet that focused on user credential harvesting and managed to infect around 3.2 million
1146 devices all over the world. Its takedown was achieved in 2015, with *Microsoft*, *Symantec*, *Anubis Networks*, *Europol* and
1147 law enforcement entities from the UK, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. The success of the takedown came as result
1148 of effectively disrupting the communication between the C&C servers and the bots, by shutting down the C&C servers,
1149 and seizing 300 domains used by the botmasters [41, 59]. Unfortunately, the success did not last, due to the fact that the
1150 individuals responsible for the botnet's operation were not apprehended by law enforcement. A few months after the
1151 takedown, the botnet resurfaced [70], and is still operational to this day [105].
1152
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1154 4.1.8 *Dorkbot*. The *Dorkbot* botnet, also known as *NgrBot*, was discovered in 2011, and it spread through USB drivers,
1155 instant messaging apps and social networks. Its main purposes were credential theft, DDoS attacks, spam, and serving
1156 as a foundation for further malware infections on the host. In the last year before it was brought down, it was considered
1157 to have infected more than 1 million devices. With law enforcement agencies collaborating with partners from the
1158 industry, the botnet's takedown was finally achieved mainly through domain seizure [65, 117].
1159
1160

1161 4.1.9 *Avalanche*. After a large ransomware attack in Germany in 2012 was traced back to the *Avalanche* botnet, the
1162 German police initiated efforts towards its takedown. *Avalanche*'s main purpose of operation was phishing, malware
1163 attacks and money mule recruiting. Over the course of its operation (2008-2016), it is estimated to have caused hundreds
1164 of millions of euros in damages worldwide, and that is due to the many malware families it has been associated with. In
1165 a joint four year long effort from organisations such as the *FBI*, *Europol*, *Interpol*, security companies like *Symantec* and
1166 some domain registries that the *Avalanche* group was using, it was eventually taken down in 2016. It was achieved
1167 through the reverse-engineering of the malware, the sinkholing of the domains identified (seizure and preregistering),
1168 which were around 800,000, as well as C&C server seizure and shutdown. This course of action finally led to the
1169 successful identification of the botnet's infrastructure and its physical servers [42, 120, 137].
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1171
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1173 4.1.10 *Andromeda*. The *Andromeda* malware botnet surfaced in 2011 and has been associated with more than 80
1174 different malware variants. After a coordinated operation by *Europol's EC3*, the *FBI*, *Microsoft*, *ESET* and a number of
1175 other organisations, it was finally taken down in 2017. The foundation for the success of the operation, was the analysis
1176 of the *Wauchos* malware family, on which the *Andromeda*'s infrastructure had been built on, over the course of 18
1177 months. This allowed for the identification and seizure of approximately 1500 domain names, that the bots were using
1178 to connect to the C&C server, which in just 48 hours resulted in visits from 2 million IP addresses from 223 countries,
1179 illustrating the magnitude of the botnet's impact [120, 136].
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1181
1182

1183 4.1.11 *Mirai*. The *Mirai* IoT botnet surfaced in 2016 and is considered one of the most notable botnets of the last few
1184 years. At its peak, its ranks consisted of 650,000 infected devices and could achieve a record-breaking DDoS attack of
1185 approximately 1TBps, while other booter services ranged from 1GBps to 30GBps. The way the FBI managed to finally
1186 discover the identities of the *Mirai* actors, was through the anonymous accounts and aliases that these individuals were
1187 using at the time on platforms such as *Hackforums*, in correlation with information they were publicly listing on social
1188 platforms such as *LinkedIn* [76, 145].
1189
1190

1191 4.1.12 *Kelihos.E*. The *Kelihos* botnet had been active since 2010, with many variants surfacing over the years and
1192 various takedown efforts against them. The *Kelihos.E* variant, was responsible for millions of spam emails daily, phishing
1193 attacks, and malware delivery, including banking trojans. It was successfully taken down in April 2017, in a joint
1194 effort by *The Shadowserver Foundation*, the FBI and researchers from *CrowdStrike*. The takedown attempt focused the
1195
1196

1197 disrupting the P2P network through sinkholing both the peers and the C&C backup domains, and by seizing and
1198 disrupting the C&C server infrastructure, which was following a hybrid P2P architecture [87, 119]. The individuals
1199 responsible for the botnet’s operation are considered to have been located in Russia.
1200

1201 *4.1.13 Necurs.* In 2020, the *Necurs* botnet was one of the biggest cyber threats worldwide. It had a wide variety of
1202 purposes, including stock scams, fake pharmaceutical spam email scams, dating scams, along with credential theft,
1203 cryptomining, as well as financial malware and ransomware distribution. *Microsoft*, along with a number of private
1204 and public partners across 35 countries, after an analysis on the DGA used by the bots to communicate with the C&C
1205 servers, were able to effectively precalculate approximately 6 million domain names, which were to be generated by the
1206 bots in the upcoming 25 months. These domains were reported to the registries they belonged, so that their registration
1207 could be blocked. Furthermore, *Microsoft*’s legal team managed to get a court order from the *U.S. District Court*, allowing
1208 for the takeover of preexisting C&C servers, operating under U.S. jurisdiction. The individuals responsible for the
1209 botnet’s operation are considered to have been located in Russia [16, 24].
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1213 *4.1.14 TrickBot.* *TrickBot* was discovered in 2016, as a bank credential theft botnet, but through the years it has been
1214 also purposed as a harvester of various credentials, such as Outlook, and malware dropper, with the *Ryuk* malware [84]
1215 being a prime example. Its main spread method is through spam campaigns containing embedded URLs or malicious
1216 attachments, and was through the *Emotet* botnet’s operation, until the botnet’s takedown in January 2021 4.1.15, which
1217 would drop the *TrickBot* malware [85]. In October 2020, *Microsoft*, with the assistance of legal authorities, took down
1218 19 U.S. IP addresses used by the botnet, and provided a configuration file to the infected hosts that would stop their
1219 devices from connecting to the botnet control points. After some help from the *Emotet* botnet and through rotating the
1220 C&C servers’ IPs, *TrickBot* continued spreading to more hosts. The botmasters also implemented the usage of Tor onion
1221 services for coordination purposes, increasing the resilience of the servers. *Microsoft*, along with their global partners,
1222 then took more action and with the help of hosting providers managed to successfully shut down 120 of the 128 servers
1223 of the botnet, which also included two C&C servers (94% of the infrastructure), that were known to be operational at
1224 the time, along with 7 IoT devices that were being used as assisting control points for the botnet [63]. Unfortunately,
1225 the efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in putting an end to the botnet’s operation. Now (February 2021), months after
1226 the takedown attempt, and after the *Emotet* botnet takedown (see Section 4.1.15), *TrickBot* has managed to replace
1227 *Emotet*, and climb to the top of the malware families ranking [105], still making a big impact on the cyber world.
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1233 *4.1.15 Emotet.* *Emotet*, active since 2014, when it started as a banking trojan, had managed to become one of the
1234 most dangerous malware [44], as a means for cybercriminals to buy access to already compromised devices, namely a
1235 Malware-as-a-Service PPI botnet. This service was available for hire, offering the choice to clients to exploit the hosts
1236 they had bought access to, however they saw fit. The way it propagated was through malicious attachments, such
1237 Word documents and PDF files, included in automated emails, which in 2020-2021, among others, also translated into
1238 COVID-19 information emails. *Emonet*’s infrastructure was composed of hundreds of control servers throughout the
1239 world, tasked with different roles, offering versatility and resilience against takedown efforts. “*Operation Ladybird*”,
1240 involved law enforcement authorities from the Netherlands, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States,
1241 Canada, Ukraine and Lithuania through *Europol* and *Eurojust*, along with the *Dutch National Cyber Security Center*,
1242 non-profit organisations and various private parties. After fully understanding how the botnet infrastructure was laid
1243 out, the authorities, through coordinated action, simultaneously seized control of the network, physically seizing servers,
1244 stolen data, such as email credentials of infected hosts, cash and computer equipment [44, 77, 107].
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1249 4.1.16 *Other notable takedowns.* Some notable efforts against botnet operations over the years, have been on *DNSChanger*
1250 (2011) by seizing the DNS servers on which the whole infrastructure was founded [74], *Nitol* (2012) by seizing the
1251 *3322.org* domain used for the coordination of the bots, and eventually sinkholing them [81], *Bredolab* (2010) by seizing
1252 the C&C servers, and *Torpig* (2009) by reverse engineering, analysing the DGA utilised by the botnet, and using it to
1253 preregister domains the C&C server was bound to use in the future. The *Ozdok* (2009) takedown was a collaborative
1254 effort from the company *FireEye*, a number of ISPs, and domain registrars, using domain seizure and preregistering
1255 as the main methods, while the *Core ood* (2011) [73] botnet was eventually taken down through domain seizure
1256 and sinkholing [31]. *Rustock* (2011), which was a spam botnet of significant impact, was finally taken down through
1257 seizure of the physical servers, following a civil legal process. *Waledac* (2010) was taken down through domain seizure,
1258 sinkholing, and peerlist poisoning, while *Pushdo/Cutwail* (2010) was briefly disrupted through the cooperation of ISPs
1259 that were in control of a large number of the C&C servers [31]. The *Srizbi* botnet (2008) takedown attempt focused
1260 on shutting down the C&C servers of the network, by cooperating with the controlling ISPs, and then preregistering
1261 domain names after reverse engineering the botnet's DGA, but unfortunately the botmasters managed to gain control
1262 though that same DGA [4]. In 2014, the *ZeroAccess* botnet was the target of a coordinated operation from both the
1263 private and public sector, which disrupted the botnet through identifying IPs used by the network and blocking all
1264 communication with them, as well as seizing the domains utilised by the botmasters [21]. In 2013, the *Kelihos.C* botnet
1265 variant was taken down by *CrowdStrike*, after a successful operation utilising peer injection and peerlist poisoning
1266 [138, 142]. Lastly, *3ve* was an ad fraud botnet that managed to infect more than 1.7 million hosts, and its estimated daily
1267 profit ranged from \$3 to \$5 million daily. In 2018 the *FBI* managed to takedown the network, through sinkholing 31
1268 domains (seizure), and by getting control of 89 physical servers. "*Operation Eversion*", as it was dubbed, included the
1269 cooperation of both the private sector and law enforcement agencies [144].
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1276 4.2 Takedown Methods and Business Model Relations

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1278 As can be noticed on Table 3, the main methods that have been used in takedowns over the years, in the majority of the
1279 cases, are domain sinkholing, through domain seizure and/or domain preregistering, seizure of the infrastructure's
1280 physical servers, shutdown of the servers and peer sinkholing through peer node injection and/or peerlist poisoning
1281 (in the case of P2P or hybrid botnets botnets e.g. 4.1.6, 4.1.12). These methods are often used in combination with one
1282 another. An overview of the takedown methods, in relation to the business models, can be seen on Table 4.
1283

1284 What is of value at this point, is how these methods can be translated into building blocks of the business models
1285 analysed in Section 3.
1286

1287
1288 *Value Chain Model:* In regard to the *Value Chain Model* (see Section 3.2, Figure 4), domain sinkholing, through domain
1289 preregistering and/or seizure, is connected to *assimilation*, since it affects the bot supply through bringing down the
1290 coordination mechanism of the network. Seizing or shutting down the physical C&C servers (or DNS servers), can both
1291 be mapped to *technology* and *assimilation*, because they can be associated with the hardware, broadband (shutdown),
1292 bot supply and coordination, as well as BPHS providers. Peer sinkholing, through node injection or peerlist poisoning
1293 [142], can be applied to botnets following a P2P or hybrid architecture. This method is connected to the *assimilation*,
1294 due to the fact that it essentially targets the bot supply and coordination mechanism, but also the *technology* block
1295 since it is related to the bot application. Lastly, in the case of *Mirai* (see Section 4.1.11), metadata and data from the
1296 anonymous profiles that the botmaster was using in the context of their operation, can be correlated to *monetization*,
1297 which includes platforms such as forums and marketplaces.
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Botnet	Year	Takedown/Disruption Methods	Reference
Srizbi	2008	Domain sinkholing (preregistering), server shutdown	4.1.16
Mariposa	2009	Domain sinkholing (seizure)	4.1.1
Torpig	2009	Domain sinkholing (preregistering)	4.1.16
Ozdok	2009	Domain sinkholing (preregistering and seizure)	4.1.16
Bredolab	2010	Server shutdown and seizure	4.1.16
Waledac	2010	Domain sinkholing (seizure), peer sinkholing (peerlist poisoning)	4.1.16
Pushdo/Cutwail	2010	Server shutdown	4.1.16
DNSChanger	2011	DNS server seizure	4.1.16
Coreflood	2011	Domain sinkholing (seizure)	4.1.16
Rustock	2011	Server seizure	4.1.16
Nitol	2012	Domain sinkholing (seizure)	4.1.16
Grum	2012	Server shutdown	4.1.2
Conficker	2012	Domain sinkholing (preregistering)	4.1.3
Citadel	2013	Server seizure	4.1.4
Kelihos.C	2013	Peer sinkholing (peer injection and peerlist poisoning)	4.1.16
ZeroAccess	2014	Domain seizure/sinkholing	4.1.16
Shylock	2014	Domain sinkholing (seizure) and server seizure	4.1.5
Gameover Zeus	2014	Peer sinkholing (peer injection and peerlist poisoning), server shutdown, domain sinkholing (preregistering)	4.1.6
Ramnit	2015	Domain sinkholing (seizure), server shutdown	4.1.7
Dorkbot	2015	Domain sinkholing (seizure)	4.1.8
Avalanche	2016	Domain sinkholing (seizure and preregistering), server seizure and shutdown	4.1.9
Andromeda	2017	Domain sinkholing (seizure), server seizure and shutdown	4.1.10
Mirai	2017	Anonymous profile data and metadata	4.1.11
Kelihos.E	2017	Peer and domain sinkholing, server shutdown and seizure	4.1.12
3ve	2018	Domain sinkholing (seizure), server seizure	4.1.16
Necurs	2020	Domain sinkholing (preregistering), server seizure	4.1.13
TrickBot	2020	Server shutdown	4.1.14
Emotet	2021	Server seizure	4.1.15

Table 3. The 28 most notable botnet takedown attempts from 2008 to 2021.

Business Model Canvas: Following the same principles applied in the previous paragraph, in the case of the *Business Model Canvas* (see Section 3.3, Figure 8), domain sinkholing via preregistering and/or seizure, points to the *key resources* and *key activities* blocks, targeting bot assimilation and coordination. C&C (or DNS) server seizure or shutdown, are both related to *key resources*, *key activities* and *partners*, since apart from disrupting the bot assimilation and coordination, they also aim at the hardware and networking of the infrastructure, affecting BPHSs in the process. Peer sinkholing, through node injection or peerlist poisoning, also affect bot assimilation and coordination, and are additionally directly related to the bot application, hence they are also mapped to the *key activities* and *key resources* segments. Finally, the case of *Mirai* can be linked to the *key activities* and *channels* blocks, since the specific takedown correlates to the profiles of platforms such as forums and marketplaces.

4.3 Takedown Challenges

Taking down botnets has repeatedly proven to be a challenging and elusive task. Organisations mounting takedown efforts, are met with issues mainly related to lack of resources, jurisdiction, especially when it comes to operations carried out in foreign countries, legal framework constraints [146], and coordination with other organisations. On the contrary, it is easier for botmasters to invest in a resilient infrastructure, that will make hostile attempts against them

Takedown Method	Value Chain Model	Business Model Canvas
Domain sinkholing (seizure or preregistering)	Assimilation	Key Resources, Key Activities
Server seizure (C&C or DNS)	Assimilation, Technology	Key Resources, Key Activities, Partners
Server shutdown (C&C or DNS)	Assimilation, Technology	Key Resources, Key Activities, Partners
Peer sinkholing (peer node injection or peerlist poisoning)	Assimilation, Technology	Key Resources, Key Activities
Anonymous profile data and metadata	Monetization	Key Activities, Channels

Table 4. Takedown methods characteristics and issues.

even more challenging. For this reason, efforts that are the product of cooperation between different organisations, tend to be quite more efficient. This is not only due to the increased resources available, but because these collaborations allow for the easier utilisation of different methods, namely civil, legal, and technical. These organisations can be security and law enforcement agencies, ISPs, domain registrars and registries, legal authorities, voluntary working groups, and large corporations from all over the globe. Despite each organisation’s individual underlying motives, be it cyber defense, profit, marketing/public relations or even plain goodwill, they share the common goal of taking down botnets, and they are willing to pool their resources towards that cause, increasing the chances of success [2, 31].

What is of interest at this point, is the overall difficulty and issues (see Table 5) that can arise in a takedown operation, depending on the methods employed. As illustrated in the previous section (see Tables 3 and 4), in most of the takedown attempts, success is accomplished through a combination of methods. Combining technical and legal methods, has proven to be more effective (e.g. Waledac, Rustock, Coreflood, Kelihos) than only taking the technical approach (Torpig, Ozdok, Pushdo) or only the legal approach (Ozdok initial takedown attempt) [31]. Some of the methods, are more challenging to implement than others, and can offer a varying degree of contribution towards the end goal.

4.3.1 Domain Preregistering & Seizure. Domain preregistering, can be employed against botnets utilising the DNS protocol in their infrastructures, and leads to the bots being sinkholed. DNS can be a part of the main coordination mechanism of the bots and/or the backup channel, which bots will use in case the main mechanism becomes the target of an attack. Both of these mechanisms can come in the form of a DGA, which dynamically generates the domains, or domains hardcoded in the bot binary that the bots use to acquire the C&C information. In many cases, discovering these domains requires the reverse engineering of the malware, which raises the technical difficulty of takedown operations.

Another method that is commonly used in takedown operations, is sinkholing through the seizure of already registered domains, which in most cases, presents the same challenge as domain preregistering, namely the malware’s reverse engineering. In this case, the main difference is that this method needs to be accompanied by non-technical actions. Seizing existing domains, requires legal warrants and/or the cooperation of domain registrars. Private parties providing DNS services to the botmasters very often do not fall under the jurisdiction of the takedown actors, and can be located all over the globe. Coordination with LEAs and other partners from different countries is vital in these situations, in order for legal action to be plausible. However, legal action at that stage is sometimes rendered redundant because some private entities such as ISPs and domain registrars, sometimes after being informed of the situation, namely the fact that one of their users is utilising their services as a stepping stone to commit cyber crimes, choose to cooperate and contribute towards the takedown of the botnet.

4.3.2 Server Shutdown & Seizure. Disabling the C&C servers of a botnet infrastructure can be achieved in two ways, by physically seizing them or disconnecting them through the ISPs. Physical seizure requires legal procedures, in order to acquire the necessary warrants, and is also heavily dependant on the server geolocation. Since the servers can be spread

out all across the globe, which is quite common, there are different jurisdictions and legal frameworks, that can surround a takedown operation. This fact makes cooperation between countries and organisations vital for an operation to be successful. This can also be the case, when attempting to disable the C&C servers through their ISPs. In this scenario the takedown actors can contact the ISPs, and try to acquire their assistance in taking the servers offline. Sometimes this approach does not yield any results, making legal warrants necessary. As with domain and server seizure, this can lead to jurisdiction issues, when the servers are located in various countries, making the takedown operation impossible to carry out without the cooperation of the corresponding LEAs and legal authorities. Furthermore, disconnection through the provider, when compared to physical seizure of the server, can prove easier to accomplish, because in some cases the provider might be willing to cooperate, removing the legal barrier confining the operation.

4.3.3 Peer Injection & Peerlist Poisoning. In the case of a botnet utilising P2P communication in its infrastructure, be it the main coordination mechanism, the backup channel, or both, the methods that can be employed are sinkholing through peerlist poisoning, where fake nodes are entered in the list of peers embedded in the botnet malware, and via peer injection (sybil attacks) [142], where fake nodes controlled by the takedown actors are added to the network. Furthermore, these methods are used in combination, like in the cases of the *GameoverZeus* (see Section 4.1.6) and *Kelihos.C* (see Section 4.1.16) botnets, both contributing towards directing the bots to specific nodes controlled by the takedown operation. Both of these methods' implementations are challenging in regard to their technical aspect, requiring the reverse engineering of the malware in order to be able to effectively inject a controlled node or retrieve the list of peers from the bot malware, and do present legal issues, hence the legal framework surrounding the takedown operation must always be taken into account.

4.3.4 Implementation & Legality. After the aforementioned methods have been executed successfully, depending on the implementation, as well as the botnet targeted, the legality of each takedown operation can vary [18]. For example, if law enforcement operated a server in the generated sinkhole, with which the bots would connect instead of the C&C server, and the botnet's purpose was credential theft, then the takedown actors could end up acquiring private user information. Furthermore, in some implementations, the takedown actors decide to gain remote access to the infected devices for remediation purposes (e.g. *Core ood, Citadel*); this can also raise legal and ethical issues [32, 146].

Takedown Method	Reverse Engineering	Legal process
Domain sinkholing (preregistering)	●	●
Domain sinkholing (seizure)	●	●
Server seizure (C&C or DNS)	●	●
Server shutdown (C&C or DNS)	●	●
Peer sinkholing (peer injection or peerlist poisoning)	●	●
Anonymous profile data and metadata	○	○

Table 5. Takedown operation challenges. Depending on the method of choice: ○= Not necessary, ●= Depends on the case, ●= Necessary.

4.4 Observations and Steps Ahead

From our analysis in Section 4.2, it can be observed that the majority of the takedown methods, can be associated with the *assimilation* and *technology* segments of the *Value Chain Model*, as well as the *key resources* and *key activities* blocks from the business model canvas. It is also clear, that takedown and disruption efforts, have not been targeting elements

of the botnet infrastructure that can be strictly related to its financial framework (apart from the *Mirai* isolated incident, see Section 4.1.11), such as the *rm infrastructure* and *monetization* segments of the Value Chain Model. Shifting focus towards these segments, will give takedown efforts a new dimension, by directly aiming at the element that is located in the center of every business, profit. Additionally, such an approach would contribute in alleviating some of the issues takedown operations are met with, such as reverse engineering of the malware, and legal challenges (see Section 4.3.4). We believe that further researching the mechanisms that are related to the revenue creating process of a botnet, with some prime examples being promotion of the products and services, along with reputation and trust towards the botmasters/vendors, has the potential to hit at the heart of these cybercriminals' operations. Hence, we argue that future research should also include this direction, in an effort to leverage potential weaknesses related to botnets' profit generation. Specifically, we believe that exploring the darkweb selling platform framework [50], which is currently supporting the botnet trading market, is a solid starting point, since the operation of these platforms is undeniably linked with the aforementioned mechanisms.

5 RELATED WORK

In this section we go over notable existing research associated with botnets, with a focus on their economic aspect.

5.1 Botnets

Silva et al. [124] survey botnets in terms of evolution, life-cycle, architectures, detection, evasion and defense. *Khattak et al.* [71] take a similar approach, and create taxonomies of botnet behaviour, detection mechanisms, and defense mechanisms. *Rodríguez et al.* [113] present a survey on botnet research, map the life cycle of botnets, and then create a taxonomy of botnet research based on this life-cycle.

In addition to the more generic research on botnets, there are also many efforts focusing on specific botnet aspects, with detection being among the main ones. The work in this field presents a lot of variety. *Alieyan et al.* [5] survey detection methods utilizing the DNS protocol. *Garcia et al.* [49] present a comparison of three botnet detection methods, utilizing a large, real-world, labeled botnet traffic dataset, and evaluate their performance. *McDermott et al.* [94] utilize deep learning in combination with word embedding, to detect botnet activity in IoT devices. The developed model is evaluated using data from attacks associated with the *Mirai* botnet. Lastly, *Prasad et al.* [110] take a bio-inspired approach and propose a model efficient in detecting application layer DDoS attacks.

There is also research focusing on the analysis of specific botnets and their characteristics, such as the work of *Antonakakis et al.* [8] on the *Mirai* botnet. This type of research is in certain occasions carried out in the context of operations against the botnet, with the works of *Stone-Gross et al.* on the *Torpig* [129] and *Pushdo/Cutwail* [130] botnets as two notable examples. On the topic of takedowns there are also more generic approaches, such as the work of *David Dittrich* [31], who illustrates the elements associated with a botnet takedown, and then presents case studies of past takedowns, along with the observations that resulted from these operations. Additionally, *Nadji et al.* [99] propose an analysis and recommendation system called *rza*, which aims to carry out post-mortem analysis of botnet takedowns, but also provide insight on how future takedown operations could be performed. Under the same research umbrella, the legal and ethical aspects of hostile operations against botnets have also been addressed by researchers, such as the works of *Dittrich et al.* [32] and *Sam Zeitlin* [146].

Year	Title	Keywords	Reference
2009	Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover	takedown, Torpig	[129]
2010	A case study in ethical decision making regarding remote mitigation of botnets	ethical and legal challenges	[32]
2012	So You Want to Take over a Botnet	takedowns, case studies	[31]
2013	Beheading Hydras: Performing Effective Botnet Takedowns	takedown analysis, takedown methods	[99]
2013	Botnets: A survey	survey, history, architectures, life cycle, detection, evasion, defense	[124]
2013	Survey and Taxonomy of Botnet Research through Life-Cycle	survey, taxonomy, architectures, detection, life-cycle, purpose and attacks, obfuscation, marketing	[113]
2014	A Taxonomy of Botnet Behavior, Detection, and Defense	taxonomy, architectures, obfuscation, life-cycle, detection, evasion, purposes	[71]
2014	An empirical comparison of botnet detection methods	detection, dataset, evaluation, comparison	[49]
2015	Botnet takedowns and the fourth amendment	takedown legal challenges	[146]
2017	Botnet command and control architectures revisited: Tor hidden services and fluxing	obfuscation, Tor, architectures, DNS	[7]
2017	A survey of botnet detection based on DNS	survey, detection, DNS, machine learning, neural networks	[5]
2017	Understanding the mirai botnet	botnet analysis, Mirai, IoT, DDoS, DNS, honeypots	[8]
2018	Botnet detection in the internet of things using deep learning approaches	detection, deep learning, Mirai, IoT, DDoS, word embedding, dataset	[94]
2020	BARTD: Bio-inspired anomaly based real time detection of under rated App-DDoS attack on web	detection, bio-inspired, DDoS attacks	[110]

Table 6. Notable research on various botnet-related topics

5.2 Botnet Economics

With financial incentives being the main motivation behind botnet businesses, researching the economic infrastructure, in an effort to gain a better understanding of how botmasters earn revenue, can prove to be critical in disrupting botnet operations. We argue that this can lead to the discovery of weak points, the exploitation of which would add a new weapon to the defenders' arsenal against botnets. There have been efforts towards both gaining insight on the economic infrastructure behind botnets, and inventing new disruption methods, based on economy related elements of botnets' operations (see Table 7).

Ford and Gordon [46] focus on analyzing the economic incentive behind spreading malicious applications such as spyware and adware, credential theft and sale, DDoS attacks and botnet sale/rent, that can be used to generate revenue for botmasters. They argue that emphasizing disruption efforts on the business models utilised by botmasters, shows significant promise.

Friess and Aycocck [47] study credential theft and how this botnet activity is used and sold in the black market. They focus on the financial motives behind creating and maintaining this type of botnet, how it creates revenue, and lastly touch upon defensive mechanisms against it.

Li et al. [83] proposed a model which is based on the utilization of honeypots in order to create virtual bots. Every botnet C&C server handles a certain number of bots. By having a substantial percentage of that number be virtual/fake

bots, they introduced a level of uncertainty regarding the botnet’s effectiveness in an attack, which in essence lowers the quality of the botnet services and their appeal to the potential clients. This can eventually lead to a significant profit decrease for the botmaster.

Year	Title	Keywords	Reference
2007	Cent, five cent, ten cent, dollar: Hitting botnets where it really hurts	spyware, adware, credential theft, DDoS, business model, disruption	[46]
2008	Black Market Botnets	credential theft, business model	[47]
2009	Botnet Economics: Uncertainty Matters	honeypots, reputation, honeypots, disruption	[83]
2011	Click trajectories: End-to-end analysis of the spam value chain	spam, value chain, captive botnets, real-time data	[80]
2011	The underground economy of spam: A Botmaster’s perspective of coordinating large-scale spam campaigns	Pushdo-Cutwail botnet, spam, forum, takedown	[130]
2013	Modeling the Economic Incentives of DDoS Attacks: Femtocell Case Study	DDoS, economic model	[118]
2014	The Botnet Revenue Model	supply chain, disruption, revenue model	[14]
2014	Toward a Monopoly Botnet Market	botnet monopoly, disruption, economic model	[82]
2016	Stress Testing the Booters: Understanding and Undermining the Business of DDoS Services	DDoS, payment methods, disruption, PayPal	[67]
2018	Business Model of a Botnet	DDoS, credential theft, spam, click fraud, cost-revenue ratio, business model	[111]

Table 7. Botnet economics research

Levchenko et al. [80] present an overview of the overall spam botnet value chain. They use three months of real-time data from captive botnets, spam feeds, and spam advertised URLs to gain an understanding of the botnet infrastructure. They also identified sites that provide botnet services and carried out purchases to gain information about the business economy.

Stone-Gross et al. [130] acquired a number of CnC servers of the *Pushdo/Cutwail* botnet, in an effort to identify the characteristics of spam botnets of that magnitude. Furthermore, they performed an analysis on the *Spamdot.biz* forum, a forum dedicated to spam related activities, giving insight on the botmaster’s perspective.

Segura and Lahuerta [118] attempt to assess the economic motivation behind DDoS attacks. They present a model mapping the financial incentives of botmasters, using data collected both from direct communication with botmasters and from past DDoS extortion incidents.

Bottazzi and Me [14] propose a model that describes the revenue making process of a botnet. In this model the ecosystem of a botnet’s operation is divided into four different segments, which together form the *supply chain*. They analyze how these different parts of the chain interact with one another and how their attributes change over time, affecting the botmaster’s revenue. Lastly, they conclude that attacking individual links of the supply chain, could be effective in hindering a botnet’s operation.

Li and Liao [82] suggest going after the smaller and newer vendors in order to turn the botnet market into a monopoly. They argue that this may prove beneficial for defenders, because according to their economic model, this will demotivate new botmasters from entering the market and increase the price of these services. This state of the market will ultimately lower the appeal of these services to the clients, reducing the overall output of the botnet industry.

1613 Karami et al. [67], targeted DDoS/booter services, attempting to disrupt their payment infrastructure through a
1614 payment intervention. Specifically, they focused on DDoS service providers that were utilising *PayPal* as a payment
1615 platform. Through the use of crawlers, they gathered information about the accounts that the booters were using to
1616 receive payments, and then collaborated with PayPal to disable them. This effort resulted in a noticeable availability
1617 drop of these services, and since the customers were having issues with payment, the customer base was reduced.

1619 *Putman et al.* [111] focus on the botnet financial infrastructure, applying the *Business Model Canvas* to a botnet
1620 business, as well as on the botnet life cycle. They use four case studies in which botnets perform DDoS, bank credential
1621 fraud, spamming and click fraud attacks, to assess the attacker's botnet set-up costs and revenue ratio, along with the
1622 financial impact on the victims of such attacks.

1624 There are also more broad spectrum approaches, identifying and analyzing CaaS characteristics, as well as how
1625 business models can be utilised in cybercrime research to map the elements and factors that are impactful in the
1626 formation and profitable operation of a cybercrime business [61, 62, 126, 127].

1628 Lastly, our effort focuses more on the specific market of botnets and the business models implemented by botmasters,
1629 in a darkweb context. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only work that presents a correlation
1630 between business models and botnet takedown methods. Through this correlation we aim to provide a new perspective
1631 on how botnet takedown operations can be strategised, and purposed to target a larger variety of botnet components.

1634 6 CONCLUSION

1635 The cyber world is still far from being considered safe from the botnet threat. Darkweb marketplaces and forums
1636 constitute a vital part of cybercrime operations, serving the two essential purposes of such a business, namely advertising
1637 and selling, while offering anonymity to their users.

1639 Cybercrime keeps evolving, aiming towards new methods of exploitation, evasion and takedown resilience. Hence,
1640 the defending side must keep up with the same pace, improving their detection and defense methods, as well as the
1641 effectiveness of their takedown operations. Takedown operations are prone to technical, legal and jurisdictional issues,
1642 and require a lot of resources along with the cooperation between countries and organisations from both the public and
1643 private sector. Hence, we argue that shifting the focus of takedown operations to also target business model segments
1644 related to revenue generation, could eliminate some of these challenges (e.g. reverse engineering of the botnet malware,
1645 legal constraints) and enhance the impact of takedown operations.

1648 Gaining a better understanding of the botnet economic ecosystem through business models, can contribute towards
1649 novel economic disruption methods. Based on our two adapted models, with the *Value Chain Model* as a point of
1650 reference (Figure 4), this would translate into directing attention towards components of the *monetization* and *rm*
1651 *infrastructure* segments. Focusing on developing methods specifically targeting the revenue generating related aspects of
1652 the botnet business, could prove detrimental for the industry. Developing methods to impair these elements throughout
1653 different levels, could assist in taking away the economic incentives and motivation of cybercriminals to further carry
1654 out their operations, and even discourage future ones from ever taking their first step into the cybercrime world.

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